E-money and communities of payments by Hueber, Olivier
E-money and communities of payments
Olivier Hueber
To cite this version:
Olivier Hueber. E-money and communities of payments. e-commerce & Gouvernance de
l’Internet, Oct 2007, Sousse, Tunisia. <hal-00441155>
HAL Id: hal-00441155
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00441155
Submitted on 14 Dec 2009
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 1
E-money and communities of payments 
Monnaie électronique et communautés de paiements 
 
Olivier Hueber 
Université de Nice – Sophia Antipolis/ GREDEG – CNRS 
olivier.hueber@unice.fr 
  
RESUME 
De nouvelles modalités de paiement électroniques (tels que Paypal) ainsi que de 
nouvelles quasi-monnaies électroniques (tels que les Linden Dollars, les Smiles ou les 
Maximiles) connaissent aujourd’hui un essor considérable. Dans une première partie, 
cet article examine comment il est aujourd’hui possible de constituer une épargne en 
ligne sans que les autorités fiscales et monétaires en soient informées et comment créer 
anonymement de la monnaie électronique. La deuxième partie examine l’émergence de 
nouvelles communautés de paiements électronique. Ces communautés ont leurs règles 
de comportement propres que la littérature standard sur la monnaie et la finance a des 
difficultés à appréhender.  
 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines which are the potential ways to settle transactions by going 
off the official public e-money. By focussing in particular on the PayPal’s and Linden 
Dollars services, it stresses firstly on the impact of new forms of electronic payments on 
the banking system. Studying such an impact allows us to spotlight the money creation 
function held by banks. Secondly, this paper shows that new nearly e-monies promote 
the emergence on new communities of payment with all the consequences traditionally 
observed in any community namely network externalities and transaction costs.  
 
MOTS CLES: INTERNET, MONNAIE, PAIEMENTS ELECTRONIQUES, MONNAIE ELECTRONIQUE, 
BANQUES. 
KEYWORDS: INTERNET, MONEY, ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS, BANKING, ELECTRONIC MONEY 
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1. Introduction 
The usual electronic money (e-money), in particular those transmitted by our usual 
credit card, does not change the way how the money is used and how the quantity is money is 
regulated by the public monetary authorities1. This kind of money is typically qualified as 
public money or central money. In the last few years, several new technologies of payment 
have progressively started to threaten the monopoly of nations of issuing public money. By 
the Internet network, it would be possible to purchase goods or services by remaining 
anonymous from the public banking system. Such possibilities would have heavy 
consequences. David Chaum founded DigiCash in 1990, an electronic cash company issuing 
electronic banknotes called cyber-bucks. Buy using the blind digital signature invented by 
David Chaum it became possible to use e-money in the same way that we use a paper 
banknote that is anonymously. In the last decade of the 20th century, many economists, 
following the example of Benjamin Friedman, argued that technology in the form of 
electronic money (e-money) might render central banks obsolete. Moreover, the anonymous 
e-banknote could be issued by any private institution which is impossible with a paper 
banknote.  
Faced with the threatens of potential new private e-money, banks made pressure on the 
European Commission to legislate in the aim of protecting the public character of the money 
and to preserve their seigniorage revenues. 
In the Europe, the regulation 2002-13 of 21 November 2002 prevented any one to issue e-
money outside the European interbank system. However, the development of the e-commerce 
is so rapid than the temptation to use anonymous ways of payment is, for many reasons, very 
strong for many e-buyers and e-sellers.  
This article examines which are the potential ways to settle transactions by going off the 
official public e-money. By focussing in particular on the PayPal’s and Linden Dollars 
services, it stresses firstly on the impact of new forms of electronic payments on the banking 
system. Studying such an impact allows us to spotlight the money creation function held by 
banks. Secondly, this paper shows that new nearly e-monies promote the emergence on new 
communities of payment with all the consequences traditionally observed in any community 
namely network externalities and transaction costs.  
 
                                                 
1 Electronic money is broadly defined as an electronic store of monetary value on a technical device that may be 
widely used for making payments to undertakings other than the issuer without necessarily involving bank 
accounts in the transaction, but acting as a prepaid bearer instrument (European Central Bank, 1998, p.7). 
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2. The potential anonymous and private character of the e-money:  
 
The Internet network makes possible the emergence of private electronic money (e-
money). A truly private, e-money originates outside the government and outside the banking 
system. For the moment, all of the new e-money that has been created on the Internet is 
actually government e-money. 
It can be possible to transfer funds anonymously with the paypal system. Nowadays, 
over than 100 millions of accounts are open in the paypal website2. It is possible to receive 
money while remaining anonymous. A simple e-mail address is sufficient for selling and 
buying. PayPal lets shop without sharing financial information. Obviously, it is easier to hide 
money from the government by using the paypal system. However, if you have a non-verified 
status on your paypal bank account you are limited in your payments. It is impossible to pay 
more than 1500, 00 €. Such a limit of payment can be crossed by creating, still anonymously 
numerous paypal accounts (see annex 1). 
The amount of money circulating from a paypal account to another is still central 
money, not private money, but can stay anonymous like any paper banknote.  
Anonymity in transaction is something that buyers and sellers often want. Forms of 
electronic money can providing anonymity but still rely on trust between the parties.  
 
In the United Kingdom, it is possible, to buy a prepaid Mastercard called Cashplus 
without informing your bank. A simple driving licence or a passport is sufficient to buy the 
Cashplus prepaid card3. With such a card, the buyer is not anonymous but, like any paper 
banknote, the money can circulate apart from the banking system.  
 
Several online resources allow residents of Second Life to convert Linden Dollars into 
US Dollars and vice-versa4. Rates fluctuate based on supply and demand, but over the last 
few years they have remained fairly stable at approximately 250 Linden Dollars (L$) to the 
US Dollar. It is also possible to make money in Second Life but such a money is not 
generated by private players of the game. All the money circulating in Second Life comes 
originally from the “real” Central Banks. Nevertheless, players earning Linden Dollars during 
the game avoid the official taxation on profits. 
 
                                                 
2 www.paypal.com 
3 http://www.mycashplus.co.uk 
4 www.secondlife.com 
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Whether it is in the Paypal, the Linden or the Cashplus electronic payment, system, the 
e-money circulates temporarily outside the official interbank system. We can observe that, the 
main effect of the private e-banking is a permanent decrease in money demand and 
consequently in the Central Banks reserves (see annex 2 for demonstration). 
If the central bank reserves decrease, the power of central bank to influence economic 
activities will increasingly weaken. 
 
The decrease in money demand due to the spreading of the e-money can be studied by 
using the Baumol-Tobin framework.  Such a framework direct attention to the transaction 
costs of moving in and out money substitutes. The “shoe-leather” metaphor – the real costs of 
too many trips to the bank or broker- stems directly from it.  
The Internet e-money permit a reduction in transaction costs (the “shoe leather cost”). 
Consequently, on one side, the interest elasticity of money demand increase and on the other 
side there is a permanent decrease in money demand. We can illustrate these macroeconomic 
effects by using the standard IS-LM model.  
By using the Fullenkamp and NSouli (2004) methodology we set up the following 
analytical example of the consequences of the e-money on the money market. This example 
shows that the e-money shift downward and flatter the LM curve and therefore decrease the 
interest rate. 
The balances on the market of the goods and services (1) and on the money market (2) 
are: 
Y = C+I+G +X – M  (1) 
Om = L1(Y) + L2(r)    (2)  
 
C = cY + C0  (3) 
I = -gr + I0  (4)  
L1(Y) = αY  (6) 
L2(r) = - βr (7) 
 
M = mY + M0    (5) 
g = 0.2 
c = 0.3 
I0 = 1 
 Om = 1 
m = 0,5 
C0 = 4 
G = 2 
α = 0,8 
β = 0,2  
M0 = 3 
X = 0 
Y = GDP, g = marginal propensity to invest, c = marginal propensity to consume, G = public expenses, I0 = 
autonomous investment, r = interest rate, C0 = autonomous consumption, Om = Money supply, X = exports, M0 = 
autonomous imports (for the final consumption), m = marginal propensity to import. α = interest elasticity on the 
transaction money demand, β = interest elasticity on the speculation money demand  
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By including equations (3), (4) and (5) in (1) we obtain the IS curve (IS1) 
IS1 : r=-Y+50   (8) 
By including (6) and (7) in (2) we obtain LM (LM): 
LM: r=4Y-5    (9) 
With (8) and (9) we find that the GDP is 11 and the interest rate is 39.  
If we introduce a e-bank in this model, the interest elasticity on the transaction money 
demand will decrease. We assume that now α = 0,6.  
In addition, with an e-bank, the customers can more easily have access to interest 
bearing assets. Therefore, the interest elasticity on the speculation money demand will 
increase. We assume that now β = 0,4.  
We find with theses changes in α and β that the GDP is now 21 and the interest rate is 
29. 
LM1: r=1,5Y-2,5 (10) 
Now, we introduce the private e-money in the form of interest-bearing checkable 
deposits. In the standard IS-LM model, the money supply function is exogenous. Here, we 
add a private e-money supply function to the exogenous public money supply function.  
(11) 4,01 =+= ββrOm  
We find LM3: r =0,75Y-1,25      (12) 
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In equation 
(11) we assume that the public supply of money does not decrease. In fact, there is a 
substitution effect. If the interest rate on the private e-money increases, the private e-money 
will be more preferred than the public money. Consequently, the public supply of money will 
decrease and the private supply of money will increase.  
Then we illustrate the substitution effect in the equation (12) 
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A flat LM curves represent Keynes’s liquidity trap in which the monetary policy is not 
effective. Consequently, with the development of the e-banking, the fiscal policy becomes 
more and more effective. 
Traditionally, Central banks try to influence the households and firms pricing 
behaviours through interest rate, exchange rate, asset price, credit, expectations and 
monetarist channels. The success of Central banks monetary policies requires positive 
demand on government money because central banks can influence real economy mainly 
through interest rates. As we have seen,  the government money demand decrease as a 
consequence of the spread of electronic money. Therefore, the real effect of central banks 
monetary policy weakens. 
 
3. The emergence of new communities of e-payment users 
 
Living in an economy where different monies coexist forces people to adapt every 
aspect of their economic activities to this new environment. The most routine daily 
transactions have to be organized differently. As explained by Heymann and Leijonhufvud 
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(1995), “Money is not a refrigerator. The picture of money as a service-producing asset is 
incomplete without a look at transactions practices”5. In the previous part, we have studied 
the link between the e-money – private or not – and the transactions costs. Admittedly, with 
the e-money the transaction costs decrease but new practices of transactions also appear. The 
monetary regime tends to be parcelled out by different communities of payment. By monetary 
regime, we adopt the Heymann-Leijonhufvud definition6. 
The economy operates with different currencies, which each one used in different types 
of transactions. Wages are paid in domestic money and households convert them partly in 
different e-monies or quasi e-monies. Different communities of payment threaten social 
institutions and arrangements that would exist in a united monetary regime. 
The emergence of different communities of payment menaces the public character of 
the money. Money can be considerate as a public good. On this subject, Wieser (1927) clearly 
regarded money as one of the founding institutions of social economy. Money is an institution 
which has social responsibilities. Money ownership must follow the same rules for anyone.  
With the Digital bearer money, networks of money users are developing apart from 
banks and others networks7. The Digital bearer money creates injustice toward those for 
practical, legal or financial reasons cannot access it. Moreover, a major change in the nature 
of money would have significant unintended consequences. For instance, the advantages for 
criminals and tax evaders could be considerable. 
Progressively, different communities of e-payment are setting up. For the moment, the 
footbridges between the various communities do not exist. Nevertheless, it is enlightening to 
make a comparison between Smiles and Maximiles.  
Smiles or Maximiles are like points, much as the airlines' frequent flyer miles. They are 
now used as rewards for visiting hundreds web sites. But as more sites are added, these points 
tend to become world's virtual currency on the internet and can be assimilated as Digital 
bearer money.  
Regarding to the Maximiles provider, it is possible to obtain Maximiles without using 
euros. More you are visiting or buying good or services on the Maximiles online network, 
more you obtain Maximiles. You can also buy Maximiles online for buying goods or services 
only available in the Maximiles’ shop network. It becomes possible to estimate an exchange 
rate between the Euro and the Maximiles. At the present time the EUR/Maximiles exchange 
rate is 0,02, i.e. with 1 euro, you can buy online 50 maximiles. 
                                                 
5 See page 85 of Heymann Leijonhufvud (1995).  
6 « By a policy regime, we mean, on the one hand, a system of expectations on the part of the public that governs 
their decision and, on the other, that pattern of behaviour on the part of the policy-making authorities that 
sustains these expectations.  The monetary regimes forms a crucial part of the environment in which both the 
public and the authorities have to make their decisions.» (p.39) 
7 Digital bearer money is like cash and can be transferred person-to-person without going through a bank or 
PayPal account. 
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By comparison with an other quasi-money network called Smiles, even if it is 
impossible to buy directly Smiles with euro, we can estimate that the exchange rate 
Smiles/Maximiles is 0,55 i.e with 1 euro, you can have nearly twice more Smiles than 
Maximiles (see Annex 3)8.  
We can observe that the exchange rate between the Euro and a private quasi-money - 
like Smiles - is different according the different goods or services. It is more profitable to buy 
a Café that to buy Petrol with Smiles. Such a difference of Exchange rate is due to the actual 
impossibility for the consumer make a rational evaluation of the Euro/Smiles Exchange rate. 
The consumer can just compare Smiles with goods or services and not with the public money. 
For instance, with perfect information the consumers would never buy Petrol in a French 
Shell Station. 
 
Even if it is not possible at the present time, we could assume a potential link between 
both Smiles and Maximiles networks. For instance, with 5.5€, we buy one ticket of cinema in 
the Smiles network then we exchange this ticket in the Maximiles network for 1000 
Maximiles because the same ticket worth 1000 Maximiles. For acquiring 1000 Maximiles in 
the Maximiles website you must give 20 euros. Therefore with 5.5€ in the Smiles network, 
you could have 20€ in the Maximiles network i.e. 20€ profit. 
Admittedly, gaining such a profit is not possible at the present time but if the quasi-
private monies will spread in a near future, a harmonisation of the different exchange rate 
should appear. 
The communities of both Paypal banking services and Linden Dollars users are growing 
very fast. The first consequence we have shown in the previous part results in the decrease in 
demand for central banks and consequently the decrease of central bank seigniorage revenue 
(Rahn 2000, p.3). The central banks make large income from issuing paper banknotes, which 
are non-interest bearing central banks liabilities. The decrease of seigniorage revenues may 
cause that central banks can not cover their operation costs. As seigniorage revenues are one 
of the most significant income sources of national treasury at the same time, it can be also 
stated that there will be a decrease in the income of treasury. 
Among the various e-money networks communities, the Linden Dollars case is specific 
and raises new questions. Traditionally, games worlds are completely distinct from the real 
world. In Second Life, a virtual world, many virtual objects - like ideas, software, surveys - 
bought or sold during the game by virtual avatars are directly marketable in the real world. 
For instance, it is possible to make and enquiry, an opinion pool or any marketing test in the 
Second Life World and selling in central money the results of these surveys in the real world. 
Nowadays, most of the biggest international firms are active in Second Life. The borders 
                                                 
8 http://www.smiles.fr/ 
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between the Second Life virtual world and the real world are increasingly fuzzy. On an 
economic point of view, this opacity complicates the rational calculus of the price vector. In 
the general neoclassical theory inherited of Walras, Jevons and Menger, the fixation on a 
price rely on the private utility. In Second Life, the players buy or sell virtual objects at a 
price based on ostentatious criteria. For instance, you do not buy a virtual coat with linden 
dollars to avoid a cold in winter but for showing yourself and showing your richness in 
Linden Dollars. Therefore, goods have not a private utility for agents but a social utility.  
The works of Veblen (1899) are helpful to understand the price determination 
mechanisms in Second life world. Veblen argues that economic life is driven not by notions 
of utility. He defined conspicuous consumption as the waste of money by people to display a 
higher status than others. For Veblen, the conspicuous leisure is a waste of time by people to 
give themselves higher status. He asserts that humans are not rational, utility-seeking people 
who try to maximize their pleasure but are completely irrational creatures that run after social 
status. Reading Veblen works by taking into consideration what occurs in Second life is very 
enlightening. In the virtual world of Second Life, the different communities of users behave 
with an emulation attitude9. The avatars attempt to mimic the more respected members of 
their group in order to gain more status for themselves10. Moreover, the emulation attitude 
modifies the mechanism of price determination. In Second Life, many goods are Veblen 
goods11. For instance, decreasing the price of the land decreases people's preference for 
buying it because it is no longer perceived as exclusive or high status products. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The communities of electronic money users are communities of practice which adopts 
specific decisions, routines and behaviours. These communities can temporarily move away 
from the official monetary regime regulated by central banks.  
Moreover, the classical analysis of price setting behaviour based on the private utility 
maximisation rule is somewhat unsuited. With e-monies, publics or privates, the monetary 
policy becomes less effective. Quasi e-monies like Smiles, Maximiles or Linden Dollars 
provide socially useful services. The central banks should not prevent them to fulfil their 
social missions. However, central banks should integrate them in the official interbank system 
both for fiscal reasons and to protect the lawful aspect of the money. Money must not 
generate exclusion. All the economic agents must have access to all type of goods and all the 
virtual shopping centres. 
                                                 
9 The term « emulation » is proposed by Veblen to illustrate the permanent run after the social status. 
10 Such a mimetic process can be studied by using the institutional isomorphic change described by DiMaggio 
and Powel (1983). 
11 Commodities are Veblen goods if people's preference for buying them increases as a direct function of their 
price. 
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Annex 1: Instructions for remaining an anonymous paypal user 
Open a personal account. It is possible to choose a wrong country of origin for 
spreading confusion. For example, we choose to tell Paypal that we are from the Netherlands 
Antilles. 
 
PayPal Account Owner Contact Infomation.  It is possible to give a wrong identity. We 
give here the following informations. 
First Name: Adam 
Last name: Smith 
Adress: invisible hand str. 
City: Willemstad 
Primary currency : euros 
e-mail address : smithadam1776@yahoo.fr 
 
Add Credit Card or Debit Card. It is possible to not give a credit card number and 
therefore being for Paypal an unverified account. 
 
The experience is the following. 
We created two paypal accounts anonymously. The first one, namely hueber@free.fr, is 
located in France. The second one, namely smithadam1776@yahoo.fr is located in the 
favourable taxation regime of the Netherlands Antilles. Both bank accounts are in euro 
currency.  
 
Step one: On Ebay.com, by using the hueber@free.fr paypal account, we sold a book of 
10, 00€.  PayPal charged the buyer's credit card and instantly credited the hueber@free.fr 
PayPal account. The buyer is not anonymous. Selling a good or a service is the only way to 
add funds anonymously on a paypal account. The other possibility is none anonymously to 
use a credit card to add funds. 
On this transaction, paypal took a commission and it remained on the hueber@free.fr 
account 9,89€.  
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Step two: From the hueber@free.fr account, we transferred the 9,89€ to the 
smithadam1776@yahoo.fr Paypal account. The transaction was not accepted by Paypal 
because the Netherlands Antilles cannot receive money from Paypal. 
Step Three: From the hueber@free.fr account, we transferred the 9,89€ to the 
tveblen1899@yahoo.fr Paypal account located in the United States. 
Conclusion: With Paypal, it is possible to transfer money anonymously abroad. It is also 
possible to create and transfer abroad thousand Paypal accounts, each of them credited of 
1500€. 
 
Annex 2: Creation and circulation of the Private quasi e-money 
Let us suppose a simple interbank system with three banks i.e. one Central Bank, one 
Commercial bank and one e-bank. The e-bank is a private company apart from the 
institutional banking system and issuing e-money buy receiving in exchange the legal 
currency. The central bank imposes on the commercial bank the obligation to keep an 
obligatory reserve. The obligatory reserve is part of the money on bank accounts, the money 
from the sale of securities or other sources. The e-bank does not have deposit reserves on the 
Central bank. In the following example, we assume that the obligatory reserve norm is 10% of 
deposits and that the refinancing rate i.e. discount rate is 5%. In the first period, with an 
accounting perspective, the interbank system can be represented by the following three bank 
T-accounts.  
Period 1: The commercial bank creates 100 euros to one of its customer and such a 
creation cost to the commercial bank 0,5 cents (5%×10€)  
Central Bank 
Assets Liabilities 
 Loan to 
Commercial Bank 
10 Legal Reserve  10 
 
 
Commercial Bank 
Assets Liabilities 
Loans 
Legal Reserve 
100 
  10 
Deposit Account 
Borrowing from the 
Central Bank 
100 
 
  10 
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e-bank 
Assets Liabilities 
    
 
 
Period 2: The customer of the commercial bank decide to transfer all the 100€ created 
for him to the e-bank. The legal money move out from the legal interbank system. This 
transfer is costly for both the Central bank which lose its 0.5€ earned in period one and for the 
commercial bank which must pay banking fee to the e-bank. For instance, the Paypal bank 
ask for 3% of the amount of money transferred as banking fee.  
  
Central Bank 
Assets Liabilities 
 Loan to 
Commercial Bank 
  0 Legal Reserve    0 
 
 
Commercial Bank 
Assets Liabilities 
Loans 
Legal Reserve 
100 
    0 
Deposit Account 
Debt to the e-bank 
   0 
100 
 
 
 
e-bank 
Assets Liabilities 
Credit from the 
Commercial Bank 
100 Deposit Account 100 
 
 
 
Period 3: The e-bank converts the 50€ into 2500 units of its private unit of account. 
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For instance, with 100€, it is possible to buy 500 maximiles12. The Maximiles cannot be 
qualified as real private e-money because it is only possible to use Maximiles in the 
Maximiles’ online store network. Nevertheless, the Maximiles network is so large that 
Maximiles can be assimilated as private quasi-money. Our three T-accounts are the following: 
 
Central Bank 
Assets Liabilities 
 Loan to 
Commercial Bank 
  0 Legal Reserve    0 
 
 
Commercial Bank 
Assets Liabilities 
Loans 
Legal Reserve 
100 
    0 
Deposit Account 
Debt to the e-bank 
   0 
100 
 
 
 
 
e-bank 
Assets Liabilities 
Credit from the 
Commercial Bank 
100 Deposit Account 
 
e-money in € (i.e. 
2500 private e-
money units) 
  50 
 
  50 
 
 
The 2500 quasi-money units privately issued can circulate on the internet network apart 
from the euro monetary regime. Therefore, the main effect of the private e-banking is a 
permanent decrease in money demand. 
  
 
 
                                                 
12 http://www.maximiles.com 
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Annex 3: Exchange rate between two private quasi-monies 
  
Euros smiles EUR/S'miles S'miles/EUR Exemple 
10 800 0,0125 80 voucher of 10 euros 
valuable in any French Casino 
supermarket 
5 500 0,0100 100 voucher of 5 euros 
valuable in any French shell 
petrol station 
15 1500 0,0100 100 voucher of 15 euros 
valuable in a bank account 
deposit of the Caisse 
d'Epargne 
35 3500 0,0100 100 Voucher of 35 euros 
valuable for buying banking 
services of the Caisse 
d'Epargne 
3 30 0,1000 10 four cafés valuable in 
any French Casino restaurant 
3 30 0,1000 10 discount of 3 euros 
valuable in any French Casino 
restaurant  
  
Euros Maximiles EUR/maximiles Maximiles/EUR  
10 500 0,0200 50 It is 
possible to 
buy directly 
maximiles 
online 
 
Maximiles  S'miles Products S'Miles/Maximiles euros 
1000 550 1 ticket 
of cinema with 
"cinéchèque" 
0,55   
50 100 1 euro 2 1
 
Conclusion: With 1 euro, we can have twice more S'miles than Maximiles 
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